The Normative Error Theorist Cannot Avoid Self-Defeat

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):92-104 (2019)
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Abstract

Many philosophers have noted that normative error theorists appear to be committed to saying ‘Error theory is true, but I have no reason to believe it’, which seems paradoxical. In defence of error...

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2020

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10.1080/00048402.2019.1582079

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Spencer Case
Bowling Green State University

Citations of this work

Možemo li braniti teoriju normativne pogreške?Joshua Taccolini - 2024 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 20 (1):131-154.
The Type-B Moral Error Theory.Anthony Robert Booth - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2181-2199.
A Dilemma for Buddhist Reductionism.Javier Hidalgo - 2020 - Philosophy East and West 70 (4):977-998.

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References found in this work

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

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