The contingent identity of particulars and universals

Mind 93 (372):527-541 (1984)
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Abstract

The primary purpose of this paper is to argue that particulars in the actual world are nothing but complexes of universals. I begin by briefly presenting bertrand russell's version of this view and exposing its primary difficulty. I then examine the key assumption which leads russell to difficulty and show that it is mistaken. The rejection of this assumption forms the basis of an alternative version of the view which is articulated and defended.

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2009-01-28

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Albert Casullo
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

Citations of this work

Object.Bradley Rettler & Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1.
A Bundle Theory of Words.J. T. M. Miller - 2021 - Synthese 198 (6):5731–5748.
Toying with the Toolbox: How Metaphysics Can Still Make a Contribution.Steven French - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (2):211-230.

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