Abstract

This dissertation deals with the epistemological and psychological aspects of the relationship between particulars and universals in Aristotle. In his genetic account in Posterior Analytics ii, 19 and Metaphysics i, 1, Aristotle provides an alternative to both Platonic recollection and a nominalism that insists that perception is only about particulars. He explains how universals arise out of perceived particulars, but is trapped in an apparent conflict between the objects of perception, which are always particulars, and the objects of knowledge, which are universals. The senses only directly perceive particulars. The intellect, however, thinks universals, which arise in the soul out of the perception of particulars, and are neither innate nor images of particulars standing in for concepts. ;I offer a solution to this difficulty by distinguishing between the object and the content of perceptions. Instead of advocating the direct perception of the universal, Aristotle claims that our perceptions contain an implicit or potential universal content that is elicited by the intellect. In the language of De Anima "the objects of thought are in the sensible forms." According to Aristotle, all thinking requires the presence of mental images supplied by imagination and which remain in the soul after the perceived object has gone. Consequently, against the contemporary interpretation that claims that imagination explains error, I argue that it chiefly allows the percipient to go beyond the perception of particulars and have thoughts about universals. ;I resolve Aristotle's apparent conflict by relying on his distinction in De Memoria between mental images in themselves and mental images regarded as likenesses of previous perceptions. When thought about in themselves, mental images disclose their potential universality to the percipient. Mental images are therefore potential universals that are fully actualized by induction and active mind. Induction provides a method by which universals are actualized: active mind enables the soul to be capable of induction at all. The dissertation concludes with remarks on the relationship between universals and particulars in actual scientific knowledge and incidental perception