Ramsey and Russell on Facts and Forms

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 9 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In an often cited paper, “Universals,” Ramsey attacked the classical distinction between universals and particulars and a 20th century version of it that Russell had set forth. Russell, early in that century, had depended on a questionable distinction taken from Frege—between universals being “incomplete” and particulars being “complete.” This was in part due, as it was for Frege, to an attempt to avoid Bradley-type regresses and account for the “unity” of propositions . But Ramsey’s forceful line of argument, taking Russell’s distinction to depend on projecting linguistic or “logical” distinctions onto “the world,” makes clear use of the predicable-subject distinction that is more basic and which he is also challenging. The discussion of Ramsey’s attack on Russell’s distinctions and of Russell’s reply in a later review, as well as of the ontological import of their controversy and its contemporary revival, leads to consideration of ontological problems in connection with atomic facts and classes and the distinction between simple and complex entities

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Where are particulars and universals?Fraser MacBride - 1998 - Dialectica 52 (3):203–227.
Ramsey, Particulars, and Universals.Peter Simons - 1991 - Theoria 57 (3):150-161.
Russell on the Relations of Universals and Particulars.Larry Lee Blackman - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:265-278.
Particulars As Universals.Herbert Hochberg - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:83-111.
The problem of universals.Charles Landesman - 1971 - New York,: Basic Books.
Frege‐Russell Semantics?Howard Wettstein - 1990 - Dialectica 44 (1‐2):113-135.
Three Views of Theoretical Knowledge.William Demopoulos - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):177-205.
Russell on Meaning and Denoting.P. T. Geach - 1958 - Analysis 19 (3):69-72.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-06

Downloads
3 (#1,519,925)

6 months
1 (#1,040,386)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references