Reply to Klocksiem on the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (2):407-413 (2020)
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Abstract

In a recent article in this journal, I claimed that the widely held counterfactual comparative account of harm violates two very plausible principles about harm and prudential reasons. Justin Klocksiem argues, in a reply, that CCA is in fact compatible with these principles. In this rejoinder, I shall try to show that Klocksiem’s defense of CCA fails.

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10.1007/s10677-020-10071-6

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Author's Profile

Erik Carlson
Uppsala Universitet

Citations of this work

A Simple Analysis of Harm.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9:509-536.
Causal Accounts of Harming.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):420-445.
How Harms Can Be Better than Benefits: Reply to Carlson, Johansson, and Risberg.Neil Feit - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):628-633.
Benefits are Better than Harms: A Reply to Feit.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):232-238.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Well-being and death.Ben Bradley - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People.David Boonin - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
A dilemma for Epicureanism.Travis Timmerman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):241-257.
Plural Harm.Neil Feit - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):361-388.

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