Free will and intentional action

Philosophia 16 (3-4):355-364 (1986)
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Abstract

I argue for the following analysis of a freely willed action: an act is done of one's own free will, if and only if, it is an intentional act performed by one acting as a rational agent from unobstructed reasons, and so situated that he or she has the capacity to forbear from performing it.

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10.1007/bf02379753

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L. S. Carrier
University of Miami

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References found in this work

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Freedom to act.Donald Davidson - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Boston,: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

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