How to be morally responsible for another's free intentional action

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 25 (3):545-579 (2023)
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Abstract

I argue that an agent can be morally responsible and fully (but not necessarily solely) blameworthy for another agent’s free intentional action, simply by intentionally creating the conditions for the action in a way that causes it. This means, I argue, that she can be morally responsible for the other’s action in the relevantly same way that she is responsible for her own non-basic actions. Furthermore, it means that socially mediated moral responsibility for intentional action does not require an agent to authorize another to act on her behalf, nor does it require her to threaten, coerce, or deceive the other.

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Olle Blomberg
University of Gothenburg

Citations of this work

Epistemic Complicity.Cameron Boult - 2023 - Episteme 20 (4):870-893.
States’ culpability through time.Stephanie Collins - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (5):1345-1368.

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