Analysis 75 (3):442-450 (2015)

Authors
Jennifer Rose Carr
University of California, San Diego
Abstract
Ecumenical views in metaethics hold that normative utterances express hybrid mental states, states which include both a cognitive and a conative component. The ecumenicist can have her cake and eat it too: the view reaps the benefits of both cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories of normative judgement. The conative component of normative judgements accounts for their necessary link with motivation and rational action. The cognitive component makes it possible for the ecumenicist to endorse expressivism without facing the most difficult Frege-Geach challenges. Ridge (2014) provides a defence of ecumenical expressivism about practical normativity that is both ambitious and compelling. I discuss and try to challenge two (unrelated) parts of the view. In the first section, I’ll raise a question for Ridge’s strategy for addressing the Frege-Geach problem, and in particular his proposed recipe for how to interpret normative assertions of arbitrary logical complexity. Then I discuss Ridge’s defence of cognitivism about rationality. I try to highlight some considerations that make expressivism about theoretical and practical rationality attractive.
Keywords expressivism  ecumenical expressivism
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anv026
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

Hybrid Accounts of Ethical Thought and Talk.Teemu Toppinen - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 243-259.
Deflating the Many Attitudes Problem.Derek Baker - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):1-18.

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