Deflating the Many Attitudes Problem

Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):1-18 (2021)
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Abstract

Attitudinal embeddings, such as ‘I hope that murder is wrong’ or ‘she is glad that eating meat is not wrong’ are a less substantial problem for expressivists than is standardly thought. If expressivists are entitled to talk of normative beliefs, they can explain what it is to for an attitude to be semantically related to a normative content in terms of being functionally related to a belief with a normative content.

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Derek Baker
Frankfurt School of Finance and Management

References found in this work

Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.
The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela A. Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Three Faces of Desire.Timothy Schroeder - 2004 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.

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