Coalitional Interval Games for Strategic Games in Which Players Cooperate

Theory and Decision 65 (3):253-269 (2008)
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We propose a method to associate a coalitional interval game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games. Associating with a strategic game a coalitional interval game we avoid having to take either a pessimistic or an optimistic approach to the problem. The paper makes two contributions to the literature: It provides a theoretical foundation for the study of coalitional interval games and it also provides, studies, and characterizes a natural method of associating coalitional interval games with strategic games



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Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.John Von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern - 1944 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. [REVIEW]E. N. - 1945 - Journal of Philosophy 42 (20):550-554.
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.David Hawkins - 1945 - Philosophy of Science 12 (3):221-227.

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