Resolving conflicting information

Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (2):191-220 (1998)
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Abstract

Information received from different sources can be inconsistent. Even when the sources of information can be ordered on the basis of their trustworthiness, it turns out that extracting an acceptable notion of support for information is a non-trivial matter, as is the question what information a rational agent should accept. Here it is shown how a support ordering on the information can be generated and how it can be used to decide what information to accept and what not to accept. This ordering, it turns out, is closely related to notions such as Epistemic Entrenchment and Grove spheres studied in belief revision.

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Author's Profile

John Cantwell
Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm

References found in this work

Probability and the logic of rational belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn.,: Wesleyan University Press.
The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through Inquiry.Isaac Levi - 1991 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
Knowledge in Flux.Henry E. Kyburg & Peter Gardenfors - 1993 - Noûs 27 (4):519-521.
Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Wesleyan University Press.

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