Nietzsche's Free Spirits and the Beauty of Illusion

Journal of Nietzsche Studies 46 (1):90-98 (2015)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT Nadeem Hussain argues that Nietzsche's rejection of intrinsic values led him to reject the existence of values generally, but that he wanted his “free spirits” to pretend to believe in values as a way to avoid practical nihilism. I examine Hussain's textual evidence and find it unsupportive of and sometimes even hostile to his fictionalist interpretation. I argue that this interpretation ignores what Nietzsche regarded as the value of the knowledge that nothing has intrinsic value, which is to allow his free spirits to go beyond the kind of phenomenology that Hussain claims Nietzsche wanted to preserve for them. Recognizing this central aspect of Nietzsche's project adds support to the much more natural subjectivist realist interpretation that Hussain rejects en route to his fictionalist interpretation. Finally, I sketch a better-supported interpretation of Nietzsche's use of pretense in valuation.

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