Abstract

This doctoral dissertation is a study of Nietzsche's views on morality in order to assess his contribution to moral philosophy. Towards this end, it examines Nietzsche's understanding of morality as well as the scope of his attack. I then offer a reading of Nietzsche's critique of morality, arguing that he rejects morality insofar as it functions within society to preserve the 'herd' at the expense of 'higher types' whose flourishing resides elsewhere. In short, I claim that Nietzsche rejects morality insofar as it proves inimical to the flourishing of these 'higher types'. I also claim that Nietzsche is more than a mere critic of morality, and that his fundamental 'ethical' preoccupation with exemplary individuals is what motives his critique, and forms the basis of his affirmative ethic of human flourishing. Moreover, I contend that Nietzsche defends his positive morality by presenting the character of Zarathustra , and later himself as exemplars of human excellence who must rely on their ability to convince others performatively, rather than by means of discourse, or argumentation. Ultimately, I conclude that Nietzsche's ethics does not fit comfortably within the moral tradition as he is an opponent of deontological ethics, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics despite certain affinities with the latter. This fact does not detract from the rich contribution that Nietzsche makes to moral philosophy as bode critic and champion of an affirmative ethic