Intentionality

In Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Some things are _about_, or are _directed on_ , or _represent_, other things. For example, the sentence 'Cats are animals' is about cats (and about animals), this article is about intentionality, Emanuel Leutze's most famous painting is about Washington's crossing of the Delaware, lanterns hung in Boston's North Church were about the British, and a map of Boston is about Boston. In contrast, '#a$b', a blank slate, and the city of Boston are not about anything. Many mental states and events also have "aboutness": the belief that cats are animals is about cats, as is the fear of cats, the desire to have many cats, and seeing that the cats are on the mat. Arguably some mental states and events are not about anything: sensations, like pains and itches, are often held to be examples. Actions can also be about other things: hunting for the cat is about the cat, although tripping over the cat is not. This -- rather vaguely characterized -- phenomenon of "aboutness" is called _intentionality_. Something that is about (directed on, represents) something else is said to "have intentionality", or (in the case of mental states) is said to be an "intentional mental state"

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,296

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Intentionality.Daniel C. Dennett & John Haugeland - 1978 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):139-143.
Intentionality.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):139-143.
Intentionality.Cathal O’Madagain - 2014 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Role of Valence in Intentionality.David Leech Anderson - 2017 - Mind and Matter 15 (1):71-90.
The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela A. Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
The intentionality of retrowareness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1988 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 9 (4):515-547.
Theory of Intentionality.Ronald McIntyre - 1989 - In Jitendra Nath Mohanty & William R. McKenna (eds.), Husserl's Phenomenology. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
15 (#976,359)

6 months
338 (#6,118)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Arguing about representation.Mark Rowlands - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4215-4232.
Are Kantian Emotions Feelings?Uri Eran - 2021 - Kantian Review (3):1-8.
Mind and Object. An Essay on Intentionality.Patrik Engisch - 2017 - Dissertation, Université de Fribourg

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references