The Weight of Truth: Lessons for Minimalists from Russell's Gray's Elegy Argument

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):261-289 (2014)
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Abstract

Minimalists, such as Paul Horwich, claim that the notions of truth, reference and satisfaction are exhausted by some very simple schemes. Unfortunately, there are subtle difficulties with treating these as schemes, in the ordinary sense. So instead, minimalists regard them as illustrating one-place functions, into which we can input propositions (when considering truth) or propositional constituents (when considering reference and satisfaction). However, Bertrand Russell's Gray's Elegy argument teaches us some important lessons about propositions and propositional constituents. When applied to minimalism, these lessons show us why we should abandon it

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Tim Button
University College London

Citations of this work

Deflationary Theories of Properties and Their Ontology.Thomas Schindler - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):443-458.
Deflationary theories of properties and their ontology.Thomas Schindler - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
Deflating the Success-Truth Connection.Chase Wrenn - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):96-110.

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References found in this work

On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 2005 - Mind 114 (456):873 - 887.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
The structure and content of truth.Donald Davidson - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (6):279-328.

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