Reinforcement learning and artificial agency

Mind and Language 39 (1):22-38 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

There is an apparent connection between reinforcement learning and agency. Artificial entities controlled by reinforcement learning algorithms are standardly referred to as agents, and the mainstream view in the psychology and neuroscience of agency is that humans and other animals are reinforcement learners. This article examines this connection, focusing on artificial reinforcement learning systems and assuming that there are various forms of agency. Artificial reinforcement learning systems satisfy plausible conditions for minimal agency, and those which use models of the environment to perform forward search are capable of a form of agency which may reasonably be called action for reasons.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,990

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Machine Learning, Functions and Goals.Patrick Butlin - 2022 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 22 (66):351-370.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-10-10

Downloads
44 (#352,336)

6 months
29 (#130,462)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Patrick Butlin
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Understanding Artificial Agency.Leonard Dung - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.

Add more citations

References found in this work

On the aim of belief.David Velleman - 1996 - In J. David Velleman (ed.), The Possibility of Practical Reason. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo). pp. 244--81.
Freedom to act.Donald Davidson - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Boston,: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
An organizational account of biological functions.Matteo Mossio, Cristian Saborido & Alvaro Moreno - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (4):813-841.
Agency and Moral Status.Jeff Sebo - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (1):1-22.
Desire and What It’s Rational to Do.Ashley Shaw - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):761-775.

View all 31 references / Add more references