Cognitive Models Are Distinguished by Content, Not Format

Philosophy of Science 88 (1):83-102 (2021)
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Abstract

Cognitive scientists often describe the mind as constructing and using models of aspects of the environment, but it is not obvious what makes something a model as opposed to a mere representation....

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Patrick Butlin
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Representation in Cognitive Science by Nicholas Shea: Reply by the Author.Nicholas Shea - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 92 (C):270-273.

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References found in this work

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Seeing‐As in the Light of Vision Science.Ned Block - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):560-572.
Perceptual Pluralism.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2019 - Noûs 54 (4):807-838.

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