Computational models: a modest role for content

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):253-259 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a cognitive process.Keywords: Computation; Representational content; Cognitive capacities; Explanation

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A clearer vision.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):131-53.
Computational Models of Emergent Properties.John Symons - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (4):475-491.
Computational Models in the Philosophy of Science.Paul Thagard - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:329 - 335.
Naturalising Representational Content.Nicholas Shea - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):496-509.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-09-14

Downloads
161 (#115,541)

6 months
20 (#125,481)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?