Abstract

This dissertation explores the import of value theory for a general study of responsibility through a critical reading of Emmanuel Levinas and H. Richard Niebuhr. By locating and specifying the functions of value theory in responsibility ethics, this study examines how the two thinkers help us to see the dynamics of value in the moral life and their contribution to responsibility ethics. I find four main insights from the interpretive dialogue between Niebuhr and Levinas: Niebuhr helps us to grasp the complexity of the moral life by illuminating the inter-subjective nature of value in the web of human relations that are historically and culturally contingent, Niebuhr helpfully points out potential dangers of certain patterns of valuation, while showing the possibility of a wider scope of value and valuation, Levinas reminds us that moral responsibility is a human task and shows the primacy of ethics as well as the necessity of clarifying the direction of our moral commitment, and both Niebuhr and Levinas expand our understanding of value by uncovering temporal and relational aspects of human goods as well as by giving deeper justifications for these goods. These insights can enhance our understanding of responsibility by illuminating the place of value theory within responsibility ethics