Philosophical Studies 163 (1):171-175 (2013)
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Abstract |
Kelly Becker has argued that in an externalist anti-luck epistemology, we must hold that knowledge requires the satisfaction of both a modalized tracking condition and a process reliability condition. We raise various problems for the examples that are supposed to establish this claim
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Keywords | Epistemic luck Tracking Safety Process reliabilism Generality problem |
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DOI | 10.1007/s11098-011-9805-3 |
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Actual and Counterfactual Attitudes: Reply to Brueckner and Fischer.Jens Johansson - 2014 - The Journal of Ethics 18 (1):11-18.
Knowledge, Evidence, and Multiple Process Types.Jeffrey Tolly - 2019 - Synthese 198 (S23):5625-5652.
A Defense of Parrying Responses to the Generality Problem.Jeffrey Tolly - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1935-1957.
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