A Tale of Two Fallibilists: On an Argument for Infallibilism

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):195-199 (2012)
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Abstract

Dylan Dodd offers a simple, yet forceful, argument for infallibilism. The argument relies upon two assumptions concerning the relationship between knowledge, epistemic possibility, and epistemic probability. We argue below that by endorsing a particular conception of epistemic possibility, a fallibilist can both plausibly reject one of Dodd’s assumptions and mirror the infallibilist’s explanation of the linguistic data. In fact, such a fallibilist may even be able to offer a more comprehensive explanation than the infallibilist. Our discussion is of interest due in part to the fact that many fallibilists have rejected the conception of epistemic possibility employed in our response to Dodd.

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Christopher Buford
University of Akron

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge.John Mcdowell - 2011 - Marquette University Press.

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