Experience, attention, and mental representation

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):978-979 (2001)
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Abstract

O'Regan & Noë make plausible that perception involves mastery of sensory-motor dependencies. Their rejection of qualia, however, is less persuasive; as is their view that we see only what we are attending to. At times they seem to oppose “internal representation” in general; I argue that they should in fact only be rejecting crude conceptions of brain picturing.

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Justin Broackes
Brown University

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An analysis of the binding problem.Jan Plate - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):773 – 792.

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