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Conditionalization and expected utility
Philosophy of Science 43 (3):415-419 (1976)
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Citations of this work
An Accuracy‐Dominance Argument for Conditionalization.R. A. Briggs & Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):162-181.
Deference Done Better.Kevin Dorst, Benjamin A. Levinstein, Bernhard Salow, Brooke E. Husic & Branden Fitelson - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):99-150.
What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3427-3463.
Rational Aversion to Information.Sven Neth - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
References found in this work
On the principle of total evidence.Irving John Good - 1966 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4):319-321.
Slightly more realistic personal probability.Ian Hacking - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (4):311-325.
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