Expected utility and constrained maximization: Problems of compatibility [Book Review]

Erkenntnis 41 (1):37 - 48 (1994)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In recent attempts at deriving morality from rationality expected utility theory has played a major role. In the most prominent such attempt, Gauthier'sMorals by Agreement, a mode of maximizing utility calledconstrained maximization is defended. I want to show that constrained maximization or any similar proposal cannot be coherently supported by expected utility theory. First, I point to an important implication of that theory. Second, I discuss the question of what the place of constrained maximization in utility theory might be. Third, I argue that no matter how we answer this question, expected utility theory cannot provide the reason why a moral disposition like constrained maximization is to be preferred to its rivals.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,347

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
120 (#150,989)

6 months
4 (#798,558)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations