Der metaphysische Begriff der Willensfreiheit und das Transferprinzip des Keine-Wahl-Habens

In Dirk Greiman & Constanze Peres (eds.), Wahrheit - Sein - Struktur. Auseinandersetzungen mit Metaphysik. Georg Olms. pp. 102-120 (2000)
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Abstract

Article on the problem of free will and determinism. A defense of the so-called "consequence argument" arguing that free will and determinism are incompatible.

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Godehard Brüntrup
Munich School of Philosophy

Citations of this work

How Molinists Can Have Their Cake and Eat It Too.Godehard Brüntrup & Ruben Schneider - 2011 - In Christian Kanzian, Winfried Löffler & Josef Quitterer (eds.), The Ways Things Are: Studies in Ontology. Ontos. pp. 221-240.

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References found in this work

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions.David Widerker - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (1):113-118.

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