The Dominance Principle in Epistemic Decision Theory

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):763-775 (2018)
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10.1111/phpr.12503

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R. A. Briggs
Stanford University

Citations of this work

Belief gambles in epistemic decision theory.Mattias Skipper - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):407-426.

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References found in this work

Paradox without Self-Reference.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):251-252.
Epistemic Decision Theory.Hilary Greaves - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):915-952.
Rational Probabilistic Incoherence.Michael Caie - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (4):527-575.

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