Abstract

Among philosophers of religion Soren Kierkegaard is often regarded as an archetypal fideist. In general terms, fideism is the view that religion is based on faith rather than reasoning or evidence. This study examines and critiques Kierkegaard's view of the nature of religious belief in light of his fideism. I argue that it is not useful to describe Kierkegaard simply as a fideist since this description applies to a whole host of philosophers of religion, some who are endeared by the term and others who are anxious to eschew it. Instead I critique Kierkegaard's efforts by identifying a species for the genus of his fideism, which I call "exclusivist". ;In identifying a species of Kierkegaard's fideism I am able to distinguish him from other fideists as well as more clearly define the concerns of his enterprise. The term "exclusivist" describes Kierkegaard's fideistic concerns in two ways. First, it means to make something singularly important as in an exclusive news story. Secondly, exclusive means to bar or prohibit as in an exclusive country club that only admits members of a certain race and gender. ;Kierkegaard's view of the nature of religious belief is an exclusivist fideism because it seeks to make his description of the path to faith singularly true and he bars all positive reasoning from the concerns of faith. I contend that the exclusivist nature of Kierkegaard's fideism has unfortunate consequences for the nature of faith itself. I support this claim by showing that the kind of religious experience Kierkegaard insists on does not parallel the religious experience of most ordinary believers. To support my case I examine several major themes in Kierkegaard's thought, which include his view of passion, his thorough rejection of positive reasoning for faith, the nature of the Christian Incarnation as an absolute paradox, and the subjectivity is truth thesis. ;I counter Kierkegaard's exclusivist fideism with a genus and species of faith that I call inclusivist fideism. Inclusivist fideism accepts the authority of faith in the life of the believer but rejects the notion that there is a fixed set of experiences that lead to faith and that reason is beyond faith's concerns. I suggest that the genus of Kierkegaard's analysis of faith is correct but that the species is wrong. Because inclusivist fideism does not essentialize a believer's pilgrimage to faith it has important advantages over Kierkegaard's exclusivist fideism