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Bending it like beckham: Movement, control and deviant causal chains
Analysis 70 (2):299-303 (2010)
Abstract
Like all causal theories in philosophy, the causal theory of action is plagued by the problem of deviant causal chains. I have proposed a solution on the basis of the assumption that mental states and events are causally efficacious in virtue of their contents. This solution has been questioned by Torbjörn Tännsjö (2009). First, I will reply to the objection, and then I will discuss Tännsjö’s alternative.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1093/analys/anp176
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Citations of this work
Doing Things with Thoughts: Brain-Computer Interfaces and Disembodied Agency.Steffen Steinert, Christoph Bublitz, Ralf Jox & Orsolya Friedrich - 2019 - Philosophy and Technology 32 (3):457-482.
Taking Something as a Reason for Action.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.
Expressing who we are: Moral responsibility and awareness of our reasons for action.Neil Levy - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (4):243-261.
Intralevel mental causation.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):402-425.
References found in this work
Essays on Actions and Events: Philosophical Essays Volume 1.Donald Davidson - 1970 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.
On deviant causal chains - no need for a general criterion.Torbjörn Tännsjö - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):469-473.
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