Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 215-236 (2009)

Authors
Stephen Biggs
Iowa State University
Abstract
Brentano famously claimed that two features demarcate the mental: consciousness and intentionality. Although he claimed that these features are intimately related, subsequent generations of philosophers rarely treated them together. Recently, however, the tide has turned. Many philosophers now accept that consciousness is intentional, where to be intentional is to have representational content, is to represent ‘things as being thus and so — where, for all that, things need not be that way’. In fact, weak representationalism, which holds that perceptual experiences have representational content, is ‘now fairly uncontroversial’.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0045-5091
DOI 10.1353/cjp.0.0046
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References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
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Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Representational Theory of Consciousness.David Bourget - 2010 - Dissertation, Australian National University
Phenomenal Concepts in Mindreading.Stephen Biggs - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):647 – 667.

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