Freedom, Markets and Moral Motivation: Towards a More Adequate Account of the Implicit Morality of the Market

Journal of Human Values 30 (1):59-74 (2024)
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Abstract

The market failures approach is amongst the most influential theories of business ethics. Its interest within the field is, in large part, a result of its rejection of moralism and any sort of applied ethics approach, favouring, in contrast, a focus on the institutionally embodied goal of economic activity, which it takes to be that of Pareto efficiency. From this articulation of the goal, or purpose, of markets, a set of efficiency imperatives are derived that are taken to comprise the implicit morality of the market. However, the market failures approach has not adequately explained the basis of market actors’ moral motivation, that is, the reasons individuals have to self-consciously adhere to moral norms governing market transactions. This failure, I argue, stems from its misspecification of the purpose of the market. After explaining this failure to address the problem of moral motivation, I argue that a distinctive mode of freedom understood as a form of self-authorship is better seen as the purpose of the market, a goal that actually animates individual market participants. I then argue that this notion of freedom is intrinsically linked to a conception of responsibility and that this notion of responsibility can be more adequately conceptualized as involving a set of market virtues focused on promoting mutually beneficial transactions. Thus, the link between freedom and responsibility, stemming from an individual’s need to legitimize their freedom in a market context, provides the basis for a self-conscious sense of moral motivation. As such, this approach better captures the implicit morality of the market while also addressing the problem of moral motivation.

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Caleb Bernacchio
California State University Monterey Bay

Citations of this work

Quo Vadis Business Ethics?Marcel Meyer & Matthias P. Hühn - 2024 - Journal of Human Values 30 (1):7-14.

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References found in this work

A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism.Robert Brandom - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity.Charles Taylor - 2016 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity.Charles Taylor - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (1):187-190.

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