Believing that You Know and Knowing that You Believe

In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. pp. 369-376 (2004)
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Abstract

Sections 1 and 2 examine Hilary Putnam's brain-in-a-vat argument and an analogous argument by Fred Dretske and show that anti-skeptical arguments from semantic externalism presuppose that we can know non-empirically that we possess beliefs and thus aren't zombies. In section 3 I argue that, given semantic externalism, we cannot non-empirically know whether we have beliefs or are zombies. Section 4 spells out the consequences of this position for Putnam's and Dretske's anti-skeptical arguments

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Sven Bernecker
University of Cologne

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