Abstract

Rather than being concerned with questions of aesthetic standards, Ingarden focuses on the question of where a musical work exists. Thus he attempts to draw clear distinctions between musical works, scores, and performances. Yet, while these distinctions seem questionable even from the standpoint of classical music, in jazz, which operates under a paradigm in which improvisation is primary, they prove far more problematic. A crucial assumption behind Ingarden's view of music is that musical performance is essentially a kind of faithful reproduction. But the question is: why does Ingarden assume this musical model? The only way to answer this question is by examining some of the basic presuppositions by which classical music functions and which Ingarden simply takes over. Although Ingarden's investigation of the musical work is usually seen as a phenomenology of music in general, precisely because Ingarden restricts his analysis to works of classical music, his conception of music turns out to be a highly limited one. In the end, the issue of aesthetic value — which Ingarden claims should come after a phenomenology of music — turns out to be what his investigation of music assumes