South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):189-199 (2014)
Abstract‘Transplant’ thought-experiments, in which the cerebrum is moved from one body to another, have featured in a number of recent discussions in the personal identity literature. Once taken as offering confirmation of some form of psychological continuity theory of identity, arguments from Marya Schechtman and Kathleen Wilkes have contended that this is not the case. Any such apparent support is due to a lack of detail in their description or a reliance on predictions that we are in no position to make. I argue that the case against them rests on two serious misunderstandings of the operation of thought-experiments, and that even if they do not ultimately support a psychological continuity theory, they do major damage to that theory’s opponents.
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References found in this work
Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life.Marya Schechtman (ed.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Personal Identity.Sydney Shoemaker & Richard Swinburne - 1984 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (3):184-185.
Intuitions About Personal Identity: An Empirical Study.Shaun Nichols & Michael Bruno - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):293-312.
Citations of this work
Can Thought Experiments Solve Problems of Personal Identity?Lukas J. Meier - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-23.
Brain Death: What We Are and When We Die.Lukas J. Meier - 2020 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews
Technological Fictions and Personal Identity: On Ricoeur, Schechtman and Analytic Thought Experiments.Simon Beck - 2016 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 47 (2):117-132.
Reconsidering a Transplant: A Response to Wagner.Simon Beck - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):132-140.
Thought Experiments and Personal Identity in Africa.Simon Beck - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (4):239-452.
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