Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life

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New York, NY: Oxford University Press (2014)
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Abstract

Marya Schechtman offers a new theory of personal identity, which captures the importance of being able to reidentify people in our daily lives. She sees persons as loci of practical interaction, and defines the unity of such a locus in terms of biological, psychological, and social functions, mediated through social and cultural infrastructure

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2017

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BD236.S34 2014

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9780199684878   0199684871   9780198801276   0198801270   9780191765155
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Author's Profile

Marya Schechtman
University of Illinois, Chicago

Citations of this work

Personal Identity.David Shoemaker & Kevin P. Tobia - 2022 - In Manuel Vargas & John Doris (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
The Subject of Experience.Galen Strawson - 2017 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Free actions as a natural kind.Oisín Deery - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):823-843.
Relational nonhuman personhood.Nicolas Delon - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):569-587.

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References found in this work

Survival and identity.David Lewis - 1976 - In Amélie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.
The importance of being identical.John Perry - 1976 - In Amélie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 67-90.
Brain death without definitions.Winston Chiong - 2005 - Hastings Center Report 35 (6):20-30.
Brain Death without Definitions.Winston Chiong - 2005 - Hastings Center Report 35 (6):20.

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