Abstract

Some nineteenth-century liberals declare that the "principle of freedom", which articulates the form of State they propose, requires the complement of other principles. This revisionist claim leads us to wonder about the way in which this principle has been understood and what has been its field of individual, social and political interference. The inquiry leads us to establish a connection between the principle of freedom and the struggle to overcome the regime of authority typical of the Ancien Régime and, specifically, with the universal possibility of being able to exercise an economic activity beyond "corporate" tutelage or vassalage. In this way, the principle of liberty is linked to the new economic regime, markedly modern, which tries to find its own laws, beyond the administrative aspect, through the new analytical field inaugurated by the new political economy of the eighteenth-century économistes. The principle of freedom is confused, then, with laissez faire, but this maxim does not mean, at first, to defend the rule of possessive individualism, but is equivalent to the possibility of restricting the interference of discretionary and arbitrary political power in people's lives. However, despite being the principle of freedom, thus understood, the mainstay of the configuration of modern subjectivity and the root of the expansion of personality, it gives rise to certain antisocial behaviors that a good part of the same liberals will try to remedy through the regulatory action of other principles. In summary, by means of various sources that have been concerned with delimiting the meaning of liberal principles, which respond to different periods and ideologically opposed schools, we attempt to define the principle of freedom and, in turn, to show the positive and negative consequences that different interpreters have attributed to its application.