Varieties of contextualism: Standards and descriptions

Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):229-246 (2005)
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Abstract

Most contextualists agree that contexts differ with respect to relevant epistemic standards. In this paper, I discuss the idea that the difference between more modest and stricter standards should be explained in terms of the closeness or remoteness of relevant possible worlds. I argue that there are serious problems with this version of contextualism. In the second part of the paper, I argue for another form of contextualism that has little to do with standards and a lot with the well-known problem of the reference class. This paper also illustrates the fact that contextualism comes in many varieties.

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Peter Baumann
Swarthmore College

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