The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity. Jon Barwise, John Etchemendy

Philosophy of Science 56 (4):697-709 (1989)
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Abstract

Some criticisms are offered of Barwise and Etchemendy's theory of truth, the principal one being that it violates a feature of truth called “supervenience”.

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Anil Gupta
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

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Are Propositions Essentially Representational?Bryan Pickel - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).
Dynamic semantics and circular propositions.Willem Groeneveld - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (3):267 - 306.
The Chrysippus intuition and contextual theories of truth.Jay Newhard - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):345-352.

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References found in this work

Situations and attitudes.Jon Barwise & John Perry - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.
Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Truth.J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson & D. R. Cousin - 1950 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 24 (1):111-172.
Truth and paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
Semantical paradox.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):169-198.

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