Counterfactual analyses of causation: The problem of effects and epiphenomena revisited

Noûs 37 (1):133–150 (2003)
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Abstract

I argue that Lewis's counterfactual theory of causation, given his treatment of counterfactuals in terms of world-comparative similarity faces insuperable problems in the form of the problem of effects and the problem of epiphenomena.

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Stephen Barker
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Backward causation.Jan Faye - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.

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