How Valuable Could a Person Be?

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):264-277 (2020)
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Abstract

We investigate the value of persons. Our primary goal is to chart a path from equal and extreme value to infinite value. We advance two arguments. Each argument offers a reason to think that equal and extreme value are best accounted for if we are infinitely valuable. We then raise some difficult but fruitful questions about the possible grounds or sources of our infinite value, if we indeed have such value.

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Author Profiles

Andrew M. Bailey
Yale-NUS College
Joshua Rasmussen
Azusa Pacific University

Citations of this work

The Neutrality of Life.Andrew Y. Lee - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):685-703.
Divine Authority as Divine Parenthood.Nick Hadsell - forthcoming - Religious Studies.

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References found in this work

Two distinctions in goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
Rethinking intrinsic value.Shelly Kagan - 1998 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):277-297.
Two Distinctions in Goodness.Christine Korsgaard - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the Good Life. Oup Usa.

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