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Thinking and believing in self-deception
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):105-105 (1997)
Abstract
Mele views self-deception as belief sustained by motivationally biased treatment of evidence. This view overlooks something essential, for it does not reckon with the fact that in self-deception the truth is dangerously close at hand and must be repeatedly suppressed. Self-deception is not so much a matter of what one positively believes as what one manages not to think.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Lying to others, lying to yourself, and literal self-deception.Vladimir Krstić - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Do the self-deceived get what they want?Eric Funkhouser - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):295-312.
On the “tension” inherent in self-deception.Kevin Lynch - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):433-450.
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