Causal Determinants, Reasons, and Substantive Autonomy: a Critical Approach to Agency
Abstract
Although the notion of agency presents itself as an attractive solution to the puzzle of free will, itfaces a problem vis-à-vis the nature of reasons that are purported to lie behind actions. In this paper,I first point out the significance of a paradigm shift that emerges with the agency view. Then I arguethat the agency theories nonetheless fail in general to give a satisfactory account of various sorts ofreasons underlying our actions and choices. In trying to enlighten the multi-faceted nature of actionsand agency, I define a novel concept, “substantive autonomy,” and claim that it is a basic fact valid forall animals, not only humans, that are capable of initiating action. Reasons may indeed be lying behind our actions in a non-deterministic and ubiquitous manner, but agency often works in the absenceof sophisticated reasons which are evidently characteristic of humans.Keywords: agency, event causation, free will, reasons, substantive autonomy.