Against Disquotation

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (4):711-726 (2022)
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Abstract

We argue against the disquotational meaning schema—‘φ’ means that φ—and suggest that rejecting it is the key to resolving further intensional paradoxes about the limits of thought.

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Author Profiles

Jeremy Goodman
Johns Hopkins University
Andrew Bacon
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Grounding Generalizations.Jeremy Goodman - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (3):821-858.
‘True’ as Polysemous.Andy Yu - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):542-569.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
The Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1903 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 11 (4):11-12.
Truth and meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.
To Be F Is To Be G.Cian Dorr - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):39-134.
The logic of paradox.Graham Priest - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219 - 241.

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