Disquotation, Conditionals, and the Liar

Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):5-21 (2009)
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Abstract

In this paper I respond to Jacquette’s criticisms, in (Jacquette, 2008), of my (Barker, 2008). In so doing, I argue that the Liar paradox is in fact a problem about the disquotational schema, and that nothing in Jacquette’s paper undermines this diagnosis.

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John Barker
University of Illinois at Springfield

Citations of this work

Liar Paradox and Substitution into Intensional Contexts.Dale Jacquette - 2010 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):119-147.

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
The logic of paradox.Graham Priest - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219 - 241.
Paradox without Self-Reference.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):251-252.
Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types.Bertrand Russell - 1908 - American Journal of Mathematics 30 (3):222-262.

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