Tarskian truth and the two provinces of semantics

Disputatio 1 (16):26-37 (2004)
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In this paper, I argue that the cleavage between the theory of reference and the theory of meaning, which under the influence of Quine has dominated a large part of the philosophy of language of the last fifty years, is based on a misrepresentation of Tarski's achievement and on an overestimation of the scope and value of disquotation. In particular, I show that, if we accept Davidson's critique of disquotation, the same kind of reasons that Quine offered in opposition to the Carnapian theory of meaning also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the Tarskian theory of reference.

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Ricardo Santos
Universidade de Lisboa

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References found in this work

The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
Understanding Truth.Scott Soames - 1998 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press USA.
The structure and content of truth.Donald Davidson - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (6):279-328.
Truth and the absence of fact.Hartry H. Field - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1978 - Philosophical Quarterly 31 (122):47-67.

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