Abstract

A study of relativism structured around the fact that there are differences between arguing for a general thesis of relativism and arguing for a limited thesis applicable to a restricted domain of thought and life. Differences between relativism and its chief competitors, skepticism and reductionism, are discussed in detail. Relativism in contemporary debate often turns out to be skepticism or reductionism instead. The discussion illuminates what is required for genuine relativism whether general or limited. It makes plain that there are both intellectual and practical consequences involved in whether one is relativist, skeptic, or reductionist as one opposes alleged absolutisms. ;The first two chapters examine problems in interpreting the general relativism of Protagoras. The argument, going back to the Theaetetus, which is meant to show that relativism is self-contradictory is discussed. Limited forms of relativism easily escape the argument. A general relativist thesis is made implausible by the argument, but is not necessarily defeated. ;In chapter three tools sharpened in the study of Protagoras are applied to contemporary debates about general relativism in linguistics, anthropology, science, and philosophy. I find many drawing unwarranted relativist conclusions on the basis of skeptical arguments. In chapter four the same tools are applied to discussions of more limited relativist theses in philosophy, ethics and science. Here confusions arise in distinguishing between relativism and reductionism. ;In the conclusion I review how general relativism is implausible and is not supported by most of the contemporary arguments offered for it. Limited relativist theses, in philosophy, ethics, and science, are seen to be more plausible. I suggest that a moderate skepticism should be carefully distinguished from both relativism and reductionism, and I offer seasons why moderate skepticism may be the most fruitful response to absolutisms. This is illustrated by an examination of important practical differences that arise when the problem of public policy about abortion is approached from the different perspectives of relativism, skepticism, and reductionism