Logos and Episteme 8 (1):7-39 (2017)

Authors
Guy Axtell
Radford University
Abstract
This paper provides an empirical defense of credit theories of knowing against Mark Alfano’s challenges to them based on his theses of inferential cognitive situationism and of epistemic situationism. In order to support the claim that credit theories can treat many cases of cognitive success through heuristic cognitive strategies as credit-conferring, the paper develops the compatibility between virtue epistemologies qua credit theories, and dual-process theories in cognitive psychology. It also a response to Lauren Olin and John Doris’ “vicious minds” thesis, and their “tradeoff problem” for virtue theories. A genuine convergence between virtue epistemology and dual-process theory is called for, while acknowledging that this effort may demand new and more empirically well-informed projects on both sides of the division between Conservative virtue epistemology (including the credit theory of knowing) and Autonomous virtue epistemology (including projects for providing guidance to epistemic agents).
Keywords bounded rationality  dual-process theory  ecological rationality  heuristic reasoning  situationism  virtue epistemology
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Reprint years 2017
ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme2017811
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References found in this work BETA

How to Be a Virtue Epistemologist.Christopher Hookway - 2003 - In Linda Zagzebski & Michael DePaul (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--202.
Unifying the Intellectual Virtues.Christopher Lepock - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):106-128.
Rationality and Psychology.Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich - 2004 - In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 279-300.

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Citations of this work BETA

Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.Guy Axtell - 2019 - Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.
Dual Processes, Dual Virtues.Jakob Ohlhorst - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
Come Now, Let Us Reason Together.Austin Dacey - 2020 - Informal Logic 40 (1):47-76.

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