The Leibniz Review 21:91-115 (2011)

Authors
Richard T. W. Arthur
McMaster University
Abstract
This paper consists in a study of Leibniz’s argument for the infinite plurality of substances, versions of which recur throughout his mature corpus. It goes roughly as follows: since every body is actually divided into further bodies, it is therefore not a unity but an infinite aggregate; the reality of an aggregate, however, reduces to the reality of the unities it presupposes; the reality of body, therefore, entails an actual infinity of constituent unities everywhere in it. I argue that this depends on a generalized notion of aggregation, according to which a thing may be an aggregate of its constituents if every one of its actual parts presupposes such constituents, but is not composed from them. One of the premises of this argument is the reality of bodies. If this premise is denied, Leibniz’s argument for the infinitude of substances, and even of their plurality, cannot go through
Keywords History of Philosophy  Major Philosophers
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Reprint years 2011
ISBN(s) 1524-1556
DOI 10.5840/leibniz2011215
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References found in this work BETA

Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad.Daniel Garber - 2009 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Logic of Leibniz’s Borrowed Reality Argument.Stephen Puryear - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):350-370.
Leibniz on Infinite Numbers, Infinite Wholes, and Composite Substances.Adam Harmer - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (2):236-259.
Leibniz on Plurality, Dependence, and Unity.Adam Harmer - 2017 - Res Philosophica 95 (1):69-94.

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