Idealistic Studies 27 (1-2):23-45 (1997)
AbstractThe generalization of Complementarity has been an ambition and a challenge to many a Bohrian scholar or quantum philosopher, and to Bohr himself above all others besides. A very recent attempt by Professor Gonzalo Munevar, proposing an extension of CTY to alternative conceptual schemes, re-opens this issue and seeks to place it within the context of modern day Relativism on the grounds that conceptual schemes belonging to different cultural groups or even different biological species are neither reducible to one another, nor equivalent, nor however contradictory and therefore simply "complementary." Such being the case, neither conceptual scheme can overrule its rival scheme, nor however include or assimilate it, being to all intents and purposes as valid as its rival, albeit fundamentally divergent from it. This conclusion inevitably guides the steps of knowledge along the path of Relativism and Subjectivism, a route which Prof. Munevar makes it perfectly clear that he would eagerly follow.
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