In refutation of complementary conceptual schemes: The objective metaphysics of complementarity

Idealistic Studies 27 (1-2):23-45 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX


The generalization of Complementarity has been an ambition and a challenge to many a Bohrian scholar or quantum philosopher, and to Bohr himself above all others besides. A very recent attempt by Professor Gonzalo Munevar, proposing an extension of CTY to alternative conceptual schemes, re-opens this issue and seeks to place it within the context of modern day Relativism on the grounds that conceptual schemes belonging to different cultural groups or even different biological species are neither reducible to one another, nor equivalent, nor however contradictory and therefore simply "complementary." Such being the case, neither conceptual scheme can overrule its rival scheme, nor however include or assimilate it, being to all intents and purposes as valid as its rival, albeit fundamentally divergent from it. This conclusion inevitably guides the steps of knowledge along the path of Relativism and Subjectivism, a route which Prof. Munevar makes it perfectly clear that he would eagerly follow.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,429

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On Davidson's Refutation of Conceptual Schemes and Conceptual Relativism.Xinli Wang - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):140-164.
A Presuppositional Approach to Conceptual Schemes.Xinli Wang & Ling Xu - 2010 - South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):404-421.
Alternative Conceptual Schemes and A Non-Kantian Scheme-Content Dualism.Xinli Wang - 2012 reprint - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:267-275.
Conceptual Schemes and Presuppositional Languages.Xinli Wang - 2007 reprint - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:119-124.
Three Models of Conceptual Schemes.Michael P. Lynch - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):407 – 426.


Added to PP

4 (#1,230,965)

6 months
1 (#416,470)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references