Abstract

Determining the character of the relationship between universals and particulars, or between general claims and determinate examples thereof is a central concern for epistemology. Hegel examines the theme of examples in relation to knowledge in the first chapter of his Phenomenology of Spirit. He argues that "sense-certainty"---the epistemological stance that takes immediacy to be the criterion for knowledge---fails to recognize the role played by examples in knowledge and experience. Although the theme of example is not explicitly dealt with elsewhere in the text, the question of the relation between universal and particular in knowledge is a crucial one for the Phenomenology of Spirit as a whole. The present study aims to develop the conception of example that is implied within Hegel's text as a whole. ;In addition to attempting a resolution of a number of the criticisms raised against Hegel's account of "sense-certainty," the first chapter develops the implications of Hegel's claim that sense-certainty fails to appreciate the fact that it relies upon a determinate conception of the nature of examples, which undercuts its claims to immediate knowledge. The second chapter focuses upon experimental knowledge, and shows that the turn to experiment in epistemology can be interpreted as an attempt to rethink the nature of examples as they relate to knowledge, Hegel's basic criticism of the "experimental conception of knowledge" is contrasted with a number of the criticisms that have been raised by recent investigations of experimental practices. Chapters three and four examine Hegel's conception of self-knowledge, and show that a number of the problems raised within the previous forms of knowing are resolved within the sphere of self-consciousness and "Spirit." In particular, the final chapter shows that the kind of self-knowing that takes place in the phenomenon of "conscientious forgiveness" has a universality that is attentive to the particularity of the situation wherein it arises. It is argued that to this form of knowledge there corresponds a conception of example---that of "exemplary selfhood"---that can successfully resolve the problem of the relation between universal and particular in knowledge with which the study begins