Abstract

This study attempts a critical appropriation of Hegel's philosophy from the standpoint of a question which is both integral to and yet transcends that philosophy. The question of method is concerned with the possibility of developing a comprehensive knowledge of the phenomenon of "knowing". If found, then such a knowledge would capture the essence of what it means to seek the truth within a set of regulative principles which are valid for all inquiry, irrespective of differing perspectives and interests. ;I argue that the quest for this universal method of knowing, although it began properly with Descartes, reached a certain level of completeness within Hegel. Rather than relying upon a static and a-historical foundation for method, Hegel replaced the concept of the cogito with a dynamic and fully historical meaning for self-consciousness. Through an examination of such works as The Lectures on the History of Philosophy, and The Phenomenology of Spirit, I argue that Hegel developed a concept of universal method which remains fully concrete within experience. ;In addition to defending the theory of philosophical method which Hegel provides within these works, a criticism of Hegel will be developed which calls into question the fundamental role which he intended The Science of Logic to play within his overall conception of method. I argue that Hegel's mistake was to presuppose that totality and intelligibility have the same referent. Thus he thought it possible to produce a knowledge of knowing and a concept of method which could subsume completely the origins of method within individual certainty. However, in giving up this origin Hegel's methods became abstract. ;I conclude that Hegel's concept of universal method need not rely upon the presupposition that totality and intelligibility have the same referent; and, if it is rejected, Hegel's concept of method can be saved from the abstractness it acquired when he subordinated individual certainty to the quest for a comprehensive system of philosophy. My criticism of Hegel has as its goal to separate system and method in such a way that a form of absoluteness becomes possible which not only allows for but insists upon the irreducible autonomy of individual certainty